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14. ABSTRACT Although the United States War Department and the leaders comprising the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) had experience in military government operations they were unprepared for the occupation of the Rhineland in 1918. The aggregate effort of key leaders, in particular Colonel IL Hunt and General Henry Allen led to a successful occupation and execution of military government operations. These gentlemen fostered innovation and unity of effort at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, while fostering foreign relations with the local German government leaders, the United States government agencies, and international partners. The collective efforts of Colonel Hunt and General Allen shaped the occupation of the Rhineland. Through their careful assessment and revision of operations, as well as the capture of lessons learned, they collectively inspired the War Department to implement programs, techniques, and procedures for military government operations that would greatly impact the preparation for and execution of such operations following World War II.					
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
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

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Executive Summary

Title: The Rhineland Occupation and its Legacy

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Thesis: The aggregate efforts of Colonel Hunt and General Allen, from 1918-1923, led to the conduction of an effective occupation and military government operations within the Rhineland, as well as, the transformation of US military government operations.

Discussion: Although the United States War Department and the leaders comprising the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) had experience in military government operations they were unprepared for the occupation of the Rhineland in 1918. The aggregate effort of key leaders, in particular Colonel IL Hunt and General Henry Allen led to a successful occupation and execution of military government operations. These gentlemen fostered innovation and unity of effort at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, while fostering foreign relations with the local German government leaders, the United States government agencies, and international partners. Colonel Hunt and General Allen continually assessed AEF progress during the occupation and adapted the program accordingly. Their efforts, throughout the occupation and later in their writings, inspired institutional change within the War Department affecting doctrine, education, and organizational structure.

Conclusion: The collective efforts of Colonel Hunt and General Allen shaped the occupation of the Rhineland. Through their careful assessment and revision of operations, as well as the capture of lessons learned, they collectively inspired the War Department to implement programs, techniques, and procedures for military government operations that would greatly impact the preparation for and execution of such operations following World War II.

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Illustrations

Figure 1. Map of the Rhineland 1919

Preface

This topic evolved as I contemplated through the course of history, how the interagency functioned during military operations. Initially, I wanted to look at command and control structures applied and the relationships leveraged amongst the Department of Defense and other United State government agencies. Thanks in large part to Dr Rudd, my advisor, I learned of the establishment of the Third Army in World War I. As I researched the history of the Third Army and the occupation of the Rhineland after the war, I learned about Colonel IL Hunt and General Henry Allen. Although I found significant documentation referencing the interagency during this time period, the impact of Hunt and Allen seemed more significant and enduring.

I hoped to learn from the occupation of the Rhineland because many issues faced by our policy makers in 1918 were faced by and continue to challenge leaders in both Iraq and Afghanistan in the 21st Century. It seems we have found ourselves unprepared for “Phase IV” operations due to the lack of anticipation, planning, and training of personnel for the execution of complex, post-hostility operations. Understanding the efforts and impact of Colonel Hunt and General Allen will help both personally and professionally, my preparation for future deployments and I hope it will help other military professionals to reflect on historic operations and the after action reviews available. By reviewing similar operations, perhaps we can avoid many of the same mistakes in the planning, implementation, and execution of military operations, specifically stability operations and nation building.

There are several people and institutions that assisted me throughout my research, which I must thank: Dr Rudd for his guidance and mentorship, patience and insight, Dr John Gordon and Dr Richard DiNardo, for facilitating trips to both the Library of Congress and the Army Heritage and Education Center, and Ms Rachel Kingcade, who guided me through the initial stages of research; her insight and assistance were truly beneficial.

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The United States became actively involved in the World War in 1917, when a small advisory team, led by General John J Pershing was dispatched to France. As his understanding of the situation evolved, it became evident that more than material goods and financial aid would be required to bolster American Allies.¹ The United States eventually sent over one million Soldiers to France. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) provided the manpower and energy required to defeat the Germans. The Unity of effort demonstrated throughout the war, would again be necessary as the military forces transitioned to occupation forces throughout the Rhineland. Together, the Allies and the United States, an associated power, would establish security and oversee the local authorities administering to the needs of the German people and facilitating government operations. Occupying the area was a simple military task; establishing a military government, however, was a monumental task, which required planning, innovation, and initiative at all levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. Two men in particular took on this task; planning, directing, assessing, and revising the requirements needed to conduct comprehensive and unified military government operations. Colonel I L Hunt served at the tactical and operational levels from 1918 to 1920, facilitating the initial concept of operations and overseeing the day to day operations while General Henry T. Allen served as the Armed Forces Germany (AFG) Commander from 1919 to 1923, at the operational and strategic levels, restructuring the military government operations forces while synchronizing national policy and international efforts. Although Colonel Hunt and General Allen served concurrently in theater, overlapping from 1919 through 1920, Colonel Hunt did not serve directly for General Allen nor did they have any annotated interactions. Yet, their individual initiatives collectively built the force structure and policies implemented in support of the occupation of the Rhineland from 1918 to 1923. This paper will illustrate how the aggregate efforts of Colonel Hunt and General

Allen led to the conduction of an effective occupation and military government operations within the Rhineland, as well as, the transformation of US military government operations.

Background

Historical Military Government Operations

Prior to the World War, The United States Army gained considerable experience in the conduction of occupation duties and military government operations. The army had participated in a series of small wars and occupations since the late 1800s, establishing precedents in military government missions in Mexico and California during the Mexican War; the Southern States following the Civil War; Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines following the Spanish-American War; as well as in Panama and China. These occupations shaped the senior military officials, leading American forces in the World War and provided them with significant experience in military government operations; however, the lessons were never institutionalized.² The main effort of these military government operations was to secure a region, defeat insurgents, establish proper government, and to a limited degree mentor and empower the local leaders. The American officers were involved in all facets of the occupation, often serving as governors and constabulary force leaders, charged with facilitating governance, economic, and infrastructure development. Officers, such as Colonel Hunt and General Allen, were able to leverage these early experiences while planning and conducting the occupation of the Rhineland. General Allen, in particular had significant experience; he served as a military governor in Leyte and he established the overall Philippines Constabulary.³ Whether the experience was gained in Mexico, the Caribbean, or the Philippines, it served as a building block for those responsible for the occupation and the establishment of a military government within the American sector of the Rhineland.

Transition from Combat Operations to Occupation

The United States political and military leaders tried to avoid participation in the World War as well as the occupation. America's initial commitment through 1917 was simply financial, providing materials and funding for Allied forces. However, as reports of the dire situation flooded in, American isolationism subsided and President Woodrow Wilson agreed to send troops. The War Department quickly developed a comprehensive plan to recruit, train, and equip up to two million Soldiers by November 1918.⁴ With the integration of the AEF along the front, German Leaders began to realize they were out-numbered and out-resourced. The Allies and the US began pushing for an Armistice and the cessation of combat operations, seeking territory, reparations, and unilateral disarmament.⁵ Senior military and political leaders hoped to avoid participating in combat operations and they likewise hoped to avoid participation in the occupation, but the US and the Allies remained weak and would inevitably require the continued support of the American military. Thus, AEF would provide both personnel and resources in support of the occupation.

General Pershing foresaw America's participation in the occupation and anticipated its intense diplomatic and political requirements. However, when the Armistice was signed and implemented on November 11, 1918, American military leaders had conducted little planning and preparation in order to facilitate and support the transition to an occupation and military government operations. In fact, the Third Army was not established until November 7, 1918 and upon activation the unit was charged with the monumental task of planning and executing the occupation and military government operations within the American sector.⁶

The Third Army was established to enforce the terms of the armistice, surrender of troops, and war material, and was charged with the imposition of a military government under the command of General Joseph T Dickman. The unit included combat tested units such as Third Corps and Fourth Corps, totally over 200,000 men.⁷ Simultaneously, the Third Army was preparing for the possible resumption of combat operations. Unfortunately, with one week to build a staff and transition from combat operations to the advance on the Rhine, in support of the occupation, few plans were developed for military government operations.⁸ Although overwhelmed by the transition and the movement to the Rhine, the AEF G2 developed and distributed pamphlets, "Notes on German Local Government," for the Third Army officers.⁹ These pamphlets contained information pertaining to German society and political formations, but material was antiquated and the number of personnel to actually receive the pamphlets was limited.¹⁰ The officers lacked maps and detailed information on the culture, political structure, and current atmospherics. The AEF ultimately lacked the information required and a plan to establish anything more than security within the American sector.

Occupation of the Rhineland

Regardless of their lack of preparation, the AEF advanced and by December, they occupied over 9000 square kilometers of the Rhineland, home to over 900,000 inhabitants. General Pershing and the AEF established their headquarters in Treves, while the Third Army established its headquarters in Coblenz, the capital of the American occupied region.¹¹ (See Map of the American Occupied Zone in Appendix A.) Upon arrival, initial guidance was disseminated to both the American Forces and the German citizens: the "Arordnungen" or Memorandum No 1 and Memorandum No 4. These documents, originally drafted by Marshall Foch, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies, were tailored by General Pershing and

distributed to the populous through the local German government officials. General Pershing used these memorandums to declare "military rule and authority would be strict and implicit obedience would be exacted, but no law-abiding citizen need have any fear...the American Army will govern in strict accordance with international law and the rules and customs of war."¹² Not only did they lay out American intent, but the memorandums defined parameters for the Germans, provided initial guidance to the AEF for the overall occupation, and also defined the mission. Ultimately, the memorandums established initial coordination of the American occupation and the assumption of military government operations by AEF staff officers.

Fortunately for the Allies, Germany was a war weary nation, the infrastructure and government systems were failing, and the people suffered from a lack of basic utilities and food. The Americans benefitted from this weakness because, just as US War Department was unprepared for combat operations in 1917, it was equally unprepared for occupation and military government operations in 1918. However, the American Army was able to saturate the American sector with Soldiers. By assigning over 200,000 soldiers to the sector, the American Army successfully established initial security and stability. The ability to rapidly and effectively secure and occupy the area provided the AEF with the additional time necessary to develop and implement a comprehensive plan for the military government operations.

Colonel Hunt

Colonel Hunt and the establishment of Military Government Operations in 1919

The primary staff officer charged with developing the overall military government operations system was Colonel Hunt. Colonel Hunt, however, did not act alone; he was the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs (OCCA) of the Third Army. He was subordinate to Brigadier

General H. A. Smith, the OCCA for the AEF and General Pershing's special staff officer charged with overseeing the establishment of a military government within the American sector. Due to Third Army's co-location with the capital Coblenz, Colonel Hunt, assigned to Third Army, was better able to assist and facilitate. Thus, Colonel Hunt's geographic location, innovation, and leadership enabled him to spearhead the design of the military government operations plan.

In his initial plan, he strove to balance the strategic requirements with the tactical needs of those conducting the operations. However, his primary foci upon implementation were at the operational and tactical levels, encompassing the daily execution of the mission. Colonel Hunt received little guidance but with a small staff, he leveraged: Memorandums 1 and 4, personal experience from past assignments, and the legal parameters dictated International Law to develop the American concept for occupation and the establishment of a military government.

Colonel Hunt echoed General Pershing's sentiments and defined military government operations as "simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war...it is not oppression."¹³ Under the guise of the Armistice, the Allies were not to replace the German government, but were to leave the officials in place. Senior Military Leaders, such as General Pershing and General Allen believed the Germans must be allowed to facilitate the daily administrative requirements, "insofar as they did not affect the occupying power or compromise its security."¹⁴ Thus, Colonel Hunt and the OCCA conducted extensive initial assessments of the American sector, while the preponderance of the forces worked to achieve security and stability. With the data gathered through the assessments and the parameters established militarily and politically, Colonel Hunt proposed a detailed plan for military

government operations. This plan defined the roles, responsibilities, and objectives for the AEF leadership and the staff officers tasked to conduct the mission at the tactical level.

The AEF staff officers were unprepared for the occupation and their role as military government advisors. Within the AEF and Third Army, serving as an OCCA representative was considered simply an additional duty for a staff officer at the Division level and below. Thus the officers serving as OCCA representatives not only lacked information and training, but they were also often balancing several staff roles and were not responsible to the OCCA but to the US Army commander in charge of the given area. The officers needed to understand civil administration and the attributes of the German government structure. Commanders all too often simply selected the staff officer with a working knowledge of the German language.¹⁵ These weaknesses led to an ineffective chain of command, impacting the unity of effort, consistency of implementation, and limited effectiveness of the American Military Government throughout the American sector. Colonel Hunt, regardless of the obstacles, prevailed.

In order to overcome some of these initial challenges, Colonel Hunt conducted weekly meetings to coordinate efforts amongst both the Allies and the American OCCA representatives. The Allies each approached the occupation and military government operations differently. By working together, they identified best practices, many of which would eventually be integrated into the American system. Colonel Hunt relied on written communiqués: bulletins and ordinances. Bulletins coordinated the efforts of the American military while the ordinances “enabled the various commanders to govern their respective sectors of the Rhineland in accordance with their own national traditions,” caveats, and policies. The ordinances carried the force of law and were to be recognized by Allied forces and German civil authorities.¹⁶ Although this system was rudimentary, it provided the clarity, guidance, and support required to

initiate military government operations throughout the American sector on the Rhine.

Regardless of the command and control mechanisms, it was the initial staff areas of emphasis instituted by Colonel Hunt that enabled the mission.

OCCA Structure and Responsibilities

Fortunately, under the leadership of Colonel Hunt, the OCCA staff structure and personnel proved flexible, innovative, and adaptive. Although the OCCA representatives worked to oversee the existing German government on a day to day basis, General Pershing felt “it was the duty of the population to regain their normal mode of life and to reestablish the schools, churches, hospitals and charitable institutions and to continue in their regular local activities... [we] rather assist and protect.”¹⁷ In other words, the Germans must take ownership of the nation’s recovery while the military members worked to ensure security, stability, and prohibited the rebirth of aggression against the Allies. However, in order to provide oversight and assistance, Colonel Hunt instituted five functional areas within the OCCA. These functional sections were Public Works and Utilities, Fiscal Affairs, Sanitation and Public Health, Schools and Charitable Institutions, and the Legal section.¹⁸ These functional areas were selected in the hopes that they would support all facets of the military government mission and any areas of governance and economics that may require intervention and oversight by the AEF.¹⁹ Colonel Hunt was able to improve OCCA effectiveness and responsiveness by fostering unity of effort and partnering with and integrating Allied nations’ civil affairs officers as well as representatives from other American government agencies. These specialists provided valuable advice, insight, and expertise in the execution and oversight of military government operations. Therefore, by providing organizational structure, focus, and support, Colonel Hunt was able to build a comprehensive military government operation initially framed around five functional areas.

The Public Works and Utilities section was developed to supervise the following municipalities: gas plants, electric plants, and water works. After an initial assessment, however, the US Army Engineers were sub-tasked to support this mission. And, just as with the government, the German officials were kept in place and told “as long as the requirements for the maintenance and safety of the troops of occupation were provided or and no public disorder occurred the occupying authorities would not interfere.”²⁰ Americans simply supervised and ensured American military requirements were met, followed by the needs of the industrial sector and finally the needs of the local populace.

The Fiscal Affairs section was initially instituted to oversee banks, taxation, and financial institutions. The American Army only provided limited oversight, due to the continual decline in the German economy. As the months passed and the mission evolved, this branch transitioned into the agency responsible for collecting fines imposed by the military provost courts, and serving as the conduit to the US Treasury.²¹

Sanitation and Public Health were closely overseen by both the OCCA representatives and US Army unit surgeons. Epidemics were of serious concern; however, the AEF Leadership was primarily concerned with the soldiers and their welfare not that of the German citizens. The Sanitation and Public Health section monitored rates of venereal disease, an epidemic amongst the soldiers. This concern resulted in the establishment of vagrancy courts, which punished soldiers and local citizens alike.²² Finally, this section was charged with overseeing: the quality of the drinking water, the availability of food, trash removal, and the status of German medical services throughout the American sector.

Schools and charitable Institutions were not really leveraged by the OCCA. However, the Army did work closely with non-government (NGO) agencies, such as the American Relief Association, the German Salvation Army, and religious groups. The US Army provided 2,500 officers and soldiers to the American Food Administration, a governmental organization directed by Herbert Hoover, in order to provide food for the Germans and Allies alike. This organization worked throughout the duration of the occupation to help feed the children.²³ AEF leaders encouraged good works by the Soldiers.²⁴ Units regularly conducted clothing and toy drives for German children and they partnered with NGOs to distribute excess military equipment such as beds, baths, soap, and clothes to the Germans.²⁵ These charitable acts carried significant political implications, resulting in stronger relations between the Germans and American forces.²⁶

The Legal section's mission was three-fold: supervision of the provost courts established by the AEF in order to try German residents, to advise the civil affairs officers, and to supervise the German courts.²⁷ The Provost courts were established to try German citizens in military courts for violations against the Law of War or the United States Military. The fines collected would fund requirements of the AEF.²⁸ Although effective, the Provost courts often imposed harsh fines.²⁹ Nevertheless, the courts were successful because they allowed the Germans to air their grievances and take part in a fair trial. Such judicious action ultimately decreased tension and strengthened the ties between the Germans and the American Forces.³⁰

Although these functional areas facilitated the initial military government operations, the OCCA was still relatively inefficient and ineffective due to its task organization and lack of authority. General Pershing's desire to "leave as much authority as possible to the Corps and Division Commanders," resulted in a poorly structured and ineffective system.³¹ Within the

American Sector, the OCCA representatives were initially aligned with tactical headquarters, accountable to the military commander for the respective sector. The civil affairs officers did not report directly to the OCCA nor did the OCCA have any significant resources. This hampered efficiency and focus and often stifled Colonel Hunt's intent and initiatives. Thus Colonel Hunt developed and issued ordinances "to govern the civilian population during the occupation," but this was slow and led to inconsistent implementation.³² This poor task organization, a result of inexperience and poor planning, required significant reform and increased authority.

Thus, Colonel Hunt and General Allen individually recognized the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness within the military government operations system: strategically, operationally, and tactically. Independently, they assessed the current program, observed Allied approaches, and developed new concepts for the program. They both concluded significant reforms were needed; however, reform required opportunity.

General Allen

General Allen and the First Revision of the OCCA

The implementation of the Treaty of Versailles in June of 1919, officially ending the war, opened a window of opportunity for the reform of the American military government operations program. Regardless of the fact that the American government refused to ratify the treaty or endorse the United States membership within the League of Nations, the War Department took steps to demobilize units. In addition, the War Department assessed the AEF's status within the Rhineland. The assessments would lead to significant changes within the AEF and in turn, allow for the restructuring of the military government operations program.³³

Thus, the War Department initiated an intense redeployment and demobilization plan, and reflagged the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to the American Forces Germany (AFG), an indication of the shift in mission and focus. The rapid redeployment of units led to a 60% decrease in troop strength (from 262,259 to 105,790 soldiers) as well as the inevitable integration of inexperienced units, replacing combat tested units along the Rhine.³⁴ Another significant change occurred; as the unit was reflagged, General Allen assumed command. General Allen has tremendous experience as both an advisor and diplomat. He served as the military “attaché” to the American Embassy in Berlin in 1897, and served in both Mexico and the Philippines as an advisor. These experiences proved invaluable to him, in addition to the time he spent in command throughout the World War and initial occupation.³⁵ These changes collectively opened an opportunity for the realignment and restructuring of the military government program.

As a commander, during the initial occupation and establishment of the military government operations, General Allen carefully studied the American and other Allies’ programs for military government. In partnership with his staff, he worked to restructure and refine the OCCA’s operations. General Allen believed:

1. The officer in charge of civil affairs should be a staff officer coordinate in rank with the chiefs of sections of the General staff
2. All senior military commanders should have the corresponding civil administrators attached to their staffs
3. Civil administrations should be selected by reason of special qualifications
4. Civil administration should correspond with the political subdivisions of the country.³⁶

Thus, General Allen was able to revise the practices at the operational level and improve the cooperation of the personnel involved in the oversight of the German government, positively

impacting strategic level operations. He realigned the OCCA representatives under their own hierarchy, creating a command and control system, independent of the operational units. By removing the OCCA representatives from the tactical units, they were afforded time to focus on their duties as official liaisons. The OCCA's revised task organization increased its unity of effort, authority, and improved lines of communication, improving efficiency while facilitating a more consistent application of policies and efforts. At last, the OCCA was recognized for its objectivity, and for its fair and consistent mission execution. Finally, this structural reorganization permanently aligned OCCA representatives to a Kreis or German County, increasing continuity as well as improving the trust and relationships between OCCA representatives and the Germans. Thus, the OCCA representatives continued to oversee the implementation and execution of ordinances and regulations within their Kreis but with greater efficiency, authority, and support.³⁷

In addition to administrative oversight, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs representative for a given Kreis was "authorized to call upon the nearest AEF commander for the necessary military assistance," ensuring security remained the primary concern for American officials.³⁸ Therefore, the OCCA representative was augmented with: a Provost Court Officer, a Medical Corps Officer, and a general assistant strengthening the relations with the German authorities in order to support and facilitate an appropriate level of supervision.³⁹ The OCCA representative oversaw the actions of a US Army military police unit, tasked to conduct patrols, ensure security, and monitor the situation as well as the implementation of ordinances and regulations throughout the Kreis.⁴⁰ Empowered by General Allen to execute their mission, the OCCA representatives finally served as the crucial nexus between the American Government and the local German government.⁴¹ These structural and organizational reforms bridged the

tactical, operational, and strategic levels of military government operations and ensured the continued success of the American military government operations in the Rhineland.

General Allen: American Military and Political Representative

Although the Treaty of Versailles opened up an opportunity to restructure the OCCA, America's refusal to endorse the treaty led to significant political and military issues. The AEF would have to continue to apply the standards of occupation as outlined by the Armistice, under "modus vivendi."⁴² In other words, American military forces would retain authority over the American sector, while waiting for an endorsement of a treaty by the US Government.⁴³ Meanwhile, the Allies transitioned from a militarized occupation force to civil authorities providing oversight and security. General Allen, in conjunction with his legal team, determined the best practice would be to assimilate the directives instituted by the Allies through the High Commission into the American sector through orders. This concept was approved by both the State Department and the War Department and gratefully supported by the Allied nations.⁴⁴ To implement the directives efficiently, General Allen and Mr Pierrepont Noyes, (the Department of State Representative to the Rhineland Commission and General Allen's civilian counterpart), would review the directives and if they were aligned with American policy, they would in turn be issued as an ordinance by the AFG.⁴⁵ Thus, the AFG would support both Allied and American policies, while ensuring consistency and unity of effort throughout the Rhineland.

Although General Allen and his staff issued orders and monitored the local German government, they worked tirelessly to refrain from controlling and interfering with the overall administration of the Rhineland. General Allen frequently served as a moderator, limiting hard line concepts and actions of the French (who were adopting progressively more aggressive

military policies toward Germany) and mitigating excesses imposed against the Germans. His efforts consistently encouraged growth, partnership, and support for the Germans, politically, militarily, and economically.⁴⁶ Under General Allen's leadership, the AFG maintained a respectful relationship with the Germans and the Americans were viewed by the Allies as a moderate force, neither pro-French nor pro-German. This positive environment, fostered by General Allen, drew together soldiers and statesmen, increasing mutual understanding, respect, and partnership throughout the American sector.

General Allen possessed an innate ability to balance military and diplomatic efforts. He rarely received significant guidance from either the American Commission in Paris or the Departments of War and State in Washington DC, although he frequently reported through official channels to regional Embassies, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War.⁴⁷ However, when Allies attempted to influence American efforts, President Wilson reminded the world: "General Allen has full authority to utilize his troops for the police of the occupied district, the preservation of order and to repel any attack which may be made upon him...Marshal Foch has no authority over the United States troops in German territories, nor can anyone direct their activities without express orders from the President of the United States."⁴⁸ In other words, General Allen was accountable only to the American Government, and it was his diplomatic efforts and dedication that balanced mission sustainment with the demands of both the Allies and Germany. When not coordinating American policies, General Allen worked to coordinate efforts and policies with fellow commanders in other sectors as well as with the political leaders throughout Europe. Thus, General Allen capably forged stronger military and political relations across Europe, increasing respect for the United States and her policies.⁴⁹

General Allen and the Second Revision of the OCCA

General Allen had a gift for creating compromise and often overshadowed his civilian counterpart. Mr Noyes, a staunch supporter for the civilian led occupation, believed General Allen represented what he feared most for Germany, the establishment of Martial Law. Mr Noyes believed “military government finds its *raison d’être* in the state of war, and from this very fact is unsuited to a condition of peace.”⁵⁰ Regardless of personal feelings, the two worked to continually improve the American Military Government.

Collectively, General Allen and Mr Noyes revised the OCCA program. This revision, the second significant revision conducted by General Allen, resulted in a plan to transition the Kreis representatives from military advisors to State Department personnel, ensuring that the American zone of occupation was a civil organization. This phased plan slowly removed the authority of the OCCA representative, the military staff officer, and transitioned the authority to the Department of State civil affairs representative. This process built continuity within the OCCA program. Regardless of the integration of civilian officials the US Army officers continued to facilitate missions involving billeting, requisitions, coal, and public health.⁵¹ This second revision, the interagency effort (comprised of the War Department, the Department of State, and other US government agencies), truly signifies the unity of effort established by General Allen.

The continued revision of the military government operations demonstrates General Allen’s vision and abilities. Therefore, in 1920, when Mr Noyes was relieved of his duties by the State Department, General Allen was selected to serve as the Senior American official. In this capacity, he would report to both the State Department and the War Department, and he would speak on behalf of the President and the American government. His nomination was fully supported by both the State Department and the War Department. Nevertheless, General Allen was uncomfortable initially with this “unusual situation...[serving] on a purely civil

commission” however, he worked to support both the political and military missions.⁵² Thus from 1920 to 1923, General Allen served as the conduit, bridging the War and State Department efforts, resulting in a revised and more effective military government and a successful American mission.

Unity of Effort

Upon assumption of his expanded mission as the United States Representation to the High Commission as well as the Commander of the AFG, Secretary of War, John W. Weeks stated:

General Allen will remain on the Rhine as the representative of the State Department on the High Commission and as America’s representative on any other mission the Washington government may deem necessary—this is in addition to his duties as Commander of troops.”⁵³

This was a significant role, requiring a delicate balance and a reliable staff. To conduct such a broad mission, General Allen delegated some of his former duties. Most notably, he appointed Colonel David L Stone, the military advisor to Mr Noyes, to facilitate the day to day co-ordinations with the High Commission.⁵⁴ General Allen empowered Colonel Stone. It was his responsibility to report weekly to the Secretary of State, remarking on the actions of the High Commission and the conditions and overall German situation. These weekly cables were shared with the War Department and the President and his council.⁵⁵ Colonel Stone assumed the responsibilities of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, overseeing all military government operations. (Colonel Hunt and Brigadier General Smith had redeployed by this point in 1920) This occurred in order to support the civil OCCA representatives now fully integrated throughout the Kreis in the American zone of occupation.⁵⁶ With the support of his staff, General Allen

assumed full responsibility of the military and political missions, unifying the efforts of the Department of War and the Department of State.

While Colonel Stone focused on the operational level concerns within the OCCA, General Allen focused on the strategic mission. General Allen continued to build his relationship with the German political leaders. Upon his initial meeting with the German Officials as the Senior American official, General Allen informed them that “under the circumstances it was time to strive for peace and moral calm and that [his] policy at all times would be for a square deal.” Thus, as his relationship with the German leaders grew, so too did his relationship with the Allied political leaders. General Allen managed to balance the demands of both the State Department and the War Department, frequently providing his views and opinion on military and political matters to the Ambassadors as well as the Leaders in Washington.⁵⁷

General Allen’s actions and memoirs validate the importance of unity of effort. Military government operations demonstrate the complexity of a whole of government approach and demonstrate the importance of personal relations and interpersonal skills when involved in international, coalition, or interagency operations. Throughout the mission, the roles and responsibilities of the American military leadership and civil authorities often overlapped and lacked clear delineation of responsibilities. Yet, by 1920, when General Allen served as the senior representative, he successfully delegated resources, focused competing efforts, and balanced competing requirements in order to facilitate the overarching American objectives. General Allen utilized his personal traits and characteristics to overcome these ill-defined relations and competing requirements. It appeared that General Allen was able to refer back to

higher, national goals, in order to rise above traditional lines of operations, placing the mission above all else.

End of Mission

By 1923, when the final order to redeploy was given, Allies and Germans alike lamented General Allen's departure. In fact, 1923 was much later than anticipated for the American withdrawal as Mr Noyes points out: "The American people should face the disagreeable fact that little real progress has been made toward European restoration...little progress can be made without [America's] active help."⁵⁸ Despite General Allen's efforts, bureaucracy continually eroded the effectiveness of the High Commission. Many issues required the intervention of the Supreme Council or even the League of Nations due to the High Commission's inability to compromise.⁵⁹ Even after the Treaty of Versailles was implemented and civil authorities assumed control, issues pertaining to disarmament, reparation, and the authority of the High Commission remained contentious, causing great divide amongst the Allied nations.

Although General Allen played a critical role in mediating these issues, and ensuring America was equitably represented, the election of President Warren G. Harding sealed the AFG's fate.⁶⁰ In 1920, President Harding was elected based on "his pre-election assurance that he would withdraw the AFG soon after his inauguration," the American public was adamant about withdrawing from European affairs.⁶¹ The withdrawal was an issue of primary concern for the public; however, it was equally contentious and heavily debated amongst American diplomatic and military leaders. The groups were often at odds, but in the cables recorded by the State Department in 1922, rationale and the desire for a smooth transition and repayment of debts outweighed the cries of the American public.⁶² European officials, especially the British and the

Germans, still hoped for continued American participation. Their requests went unanswered; President Harding ordered the return of General Allen and the redeployment of all American Forces-Germany on January 7, 1923. Thus, on January 24, 1923, General Allen lowered the colors and the last Americans departed Germany, transitioning responsibility for the Coblenz bridgehead to the French military.⁶³

Lessons Learned and the Legacy of Military Government Operations

Employment of Citizen Soldiers and Specific Military Occupational Specialties

The War Department captured many lessons learned as a result of the occupation and the execution of military government operations in the Rhineland. The War Department recognized its greatest asset were the soldiers, especially the National Guard, who served a critical role throughout the war and the occupation. The National Guard is the oldest branch of the U.S. military, and during World War I, the National Guard provided 40% of the US Army's combat forces. Therefore, many Soldiers, especially the officers, who came into the military depended on the skills and training they received prior to conscription.⁶⁴ These citizen soldiers proved invaluable to the mission, often filling staff assignments more akin to their civilian expertise than their military occupational specialty (MOS). The War Department learned the value of the support and service MOSs, because the transition from combat operations to occupation duties required a more diverse and technical military. This innovative use of available military manpower compensated for the lack of training and institutionalization of military government operations.

The OCCA worked to leverage support and service MOSs within the military. Although the infantry soldiers served a crucial role in the initial security and stabilization of the Rhineland,

soldiers trained in intelligence, engineering, and policing were equally critical to the occupation. These enablers became critical to the successful occupation of the Rhineland.

The G-2 or intelligence section was particularly important throughout the occupation. They censored the mail and publications, monitored communications and radio messages, and developed a robust counter-intelligence cell, training operatives, and agents. It was the G-2's responsibility to exchange information with Allied intelligence services, the military attaches, and the American Mission in Berlin, serving as a political and military intelligence fusion cell.⁶⁵ The G2 served as the intelligence center, compiling data from sources including the Germans, Allied agencies, other US Government agencies and political and civilian entities throughout Europe.⁶⁶ Thus, the G2 not only protected the American Forces but also provided a common operating picture, utilized in support of critical decision making by political and military leaders alike.

The engineers were also instrumental to the occupation, initially assisting with assessments of the infrastructure and utilities; they soon worked with the OCCA to monitor the entire system. Basic services were critical to the security and stabilization of the region; however, to maintain and even to oversee the Germans providing these services, special skills were required. The Engineers provided the expertise and knowledge necessary to monitor and assist in the re-establishment and maintenance of the German infrastructure. They prevented corruption within the German system by monitoring resources and personnel. But their lasting contribution was the overall modernization of the infrastructure, significantly improving effectiveness and efficiency. The engineers possessed the capability to monitor, sustain, and renovate German utilities while enhancing the American mission and improving the quality of life for the German citizens.

Finally, the OCCA relied heavily on the US Army military police (MP). As the number of combat troops decreased the utilization of military police increased. The MPs conducted patrols and helped to reorganize and train the German police at the local level. They served as the eyes and ears for the lone OCCA representatives. The MPs had better interpersonal skills and law enforcement skills than the typical combat arms soldier, increasing security and stability. They successfully policed both the American forces and the Germans. Their efforts supported military government operations as well as the provost courts, while increasing the legitimacy of both the American military and German government. By leveraging the soldiers and officers with special skills or MOSs, the OCCA became a more informed, effective, and united organization, earning the respect of the Germans, Allies, and American people.

Institutional Change due to the Occupation and Military Government Operations

Although the War Department did a good job leveraging the soldiers, the senior leaders recognized its institutions lacked the capability and doctrine to adequately prepare individuals for military government operations. Both Colonel Hunt and General Allen were intimately aware of the institutional shortcomings. They constantly evaluated the mission and the soldiers. Fortunately, they included shortcomings and lessons learned in their writings. Colonel Hunt and General Allen wrote extensively about the occupation and the American military government operations.

Colonel Hunt edited the reports compiled by his staff, entitled *American Military Government of Occupied Germany: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs*. These volumes now serve as an objective summary of the AEF's military government operations. While political issues are woven into the narrative, Colonel Hunt's main foci were the tactical

and operational levels of the military government operations as well as the actual techniques and methods utilized by the OCCA. These reports discussed at length the structures, organizations, and steps taken to develop, institute, and refine the OCCA. Colonel Hunt's papers have been widely read and frequently documented by historians. The papers were condensed into a reference for staff members in 1920: *Hunt Digest Report*.

Throughout the occupation, Colonel Hunt maintained the momentum by addressing these lessons learned and adapting the military government operations as conditions changed. He would educate newly arriving personnel in order to preserve continuity and he outlined the policies, proper actions, and expectations for [military] personnel interacting with the Germans in written documents such as the *Third Army Booklet of Instruction*.⁶⁷ From his original reports, the Army developed the *Hunt Report Digest: American Military Government of Occupied Germany 1918-1920*. This brief, 28 page pamphlet, published in 1920, outlined lessons learned and discussed the initial occupation and the required components, skill-sets, and personnel organization for the establishment of military government operations.

General Allen's works, on the other hand are more personal in nature, yet the works reflect greatly on the occupation at the strategic level, emphasizing the overarching military and diplomatic efforts. He talks at length about the relationships between members of State and War, Washington agencies, and European commissions. He was critical of both Allies and American members involved in the occupation. These first person accounts not only capture lessons learned but also served as a guide for institutional change and program development.

Based on the occupation of the Rhineland, the changes integrated throughout the mission, and the post deployment writing and reports, both the War Department and the State Department

were able to compile FM 27-5: Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, establishing policies and procedures for Military Government operations. The Departments revised and clarified sections contained in the Rule of Land Warfare Manual to reflect occupation duties and responsibilities.⁶⁸ The War Department, in particular the Office of the Judge Advocate General, recognized the weakness of the administration of military justice and worked to revise FM 27-10: Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare, in order to solidify the Military's efforts and actions.⁶⁹ The lessons captured by Colonel Hunt and General Allen continue to guide military officers, as the Field Manuals (although consistently updated throughout the years) remain in print to this day.

In addition to the doctrine, the War Department worked to refine its institutions and training programs. Officers often lacked training and the specific skill sets required to support and oversee a civilian government. Senior War Department officials recognized the shortcoming and proposals were developed in the 1940s to institute formal training for officers, "with instruction cover[ing] the laws and practices of military government, the history of such government...language, geography, history, economics, government and politics."⁷⁰ These critical skill sets were a force multiplier and capable of furthering national policies. Eventually, this training grew into the Civil Affairs School, established in 1942 at the University of Virginia and prepared the US War Department for World War II and its aftermath.⁷¹

OCCA representatives, from the tactical through strategic level, worked to balance governance issues such as finance, public health, commerce, industry, agriculture, economic, public welfare, and labor relations as well as tradition military and tactics and staff procedures.⁷² As early as 1919, the War Department recognized how unprepared the staff officers were and it

developed programs for staff officers, both in theater and in the United States. These programs institutionalized a “full comprehension of the agencies, governmental as well as industrial, necessarily involved in a nation at war.”⁷³ In support of this effort, the War Department established the General Staff College. This institution focused its studies on economics and the industrial and interagency support required to prepare and sustain a military at war. Such efforts required extensive coordination and communication between the War Department, other US agencies, and American Industry. Hence the War Department recognized its interdependency on other agencies and American industry to prepare for and support a war, and they wanted to sustain the relationships forged during the World War.⁷⁴


The Department of State also recognized the need for professional, long-term civil affairs officers and therefore enacted the Office of Occupied Areas. This agency would develop training and policies for Department of State members supporting military government operations.⁷⁵ This agency actively facilitated the occupations post-World War II in both Europe and Asia. The Office of Occupied areas mission continues today, but it is now facilitated by regional offices.⁷⁶ Collectively, the War Department and the State Department instituted doctrine in order to coordinate efforts and improve cooperation while facilitating a military government. Colonel Hunt believed the “greatest danger to an Army in time of peace is that it may regress and not progress.”⁷⁷ Thus the lessons learned, organizational changes, and the institutional revisions proposed by Colonel Hunt and General Allen would continue to serve the nation well during and after World War II.⁷⁸

Conclusion

The aggregate efforts of Colonel Hunt and General Allen led to an effective occupation of the Rhineland, as well as the transformation of the US military government operations. Their efforts, during and after the war, established the ground work for all future military government operations, most notably through the creation and institution of doctrine and training. At the tactical and operational levels, Colonel Hunt not only captured lessons learned but also developed and refined the day to day execution of the military government operations, while at the strategic level, General Allen was able to further refine the military government operations, reorganizing and empowering the OCCA. He generated unity of effort amongst the US government agencies and international partners, improving support for the mission. Never was a title “A Soldier and a Statesman” more applicable than in reference to Colonel Hunt and General Allen. Both served to bridge military action and political necessity, developing governance, economics, and security, all while ensuring the needs of the German population and their own soldiers were met. Colonel Hunt and General Allen strove to forge critical relationships with NGOs, US agencies, and the international community. The unity of effort they inspired led to a successful mission, tactically, operationally, and strategically. Their ability to create, lead, and assess ensured the American system was responsive to the evolving political environment within the Rhineland. By leveraging their own experience, empowering the OCCA representatives, and integrating experts from other agencies they built an effective and efficient military government operations system that would serve as the corner stone for all future military government operations.

Illustrations

Figure 1:



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⁶⁹ U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports, 1919, VOL I.* Washington DC: GPO, 1919, 35.

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